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DEFINING “BREACH OF THE PEACE” IN SELF-HELP
REPOSSESSIONS
Ryan McRobert
Abstract: Since Roman times, creditors have invoked the limited extrajudicial remedy of
self-help repossession. Pre-colonial English laws also allowed for a limited repossession
remedy outside of the courts, provided the creditor accomplished the repossession without a
“breach of the peace.” The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has allowed for the self-help
remedy since the 1950s, making it available for any secured party in the event of contractual
default so long as there was no breach of the peace. The drafters of the UCC, however, failed
to define what constituted a “breach of the peace,” choosing to allow the courts to flesh out
the definition in a fact specific, ex post fashion. This has resulted in a lack of clarity and
consistency across jurisdictions as each court attempts to craft a breach of the peace
requirement without guidance from the UCC. This Comment argues that courts across the
country should adopt a two-part test for determining whether a breach of the peace occurred
during self-help repossession. The two-part test involves three per se rules of exclusion
followed by consideration of two factors to reach a final decision.

INTRODUCTION
The concept of self-help repossession has existed in law and society
since Roman times.1 Repossession is “[t]he act or an instance of retaking
property”2 and self-help is “[a]n attempt to redress a perceived wrong by
one’s own action rather than through the normal legal process.”3
Throughout history, this concept has allowed individuals to regain
possession of their rightful and legal property without resorting to a
formal judicial process. Appearing in the Roman Empire,4 the concept
evolved over time as it progressed through other societies,5 into English
law,6 and then finally into the common law of the United States.7
Congress first recognized the self-help repossession remedy in the

1. 3 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY - A PRESENTATION OF THE
THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 280–81 (1906).
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Id. at 1391.
4. See generally STREET, supra note 1.
5. Id. at 282–88.
6. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 575–76 (2d ed. 1898).
7. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 613 (1842).
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Uniform Conditional Sales Act,8 and it is presently codified in
section 9-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).9
The UCC established a very formal process for self-help repossession.
Only secured parties have the option of self-help repossession.10 In order
to become secured, the party must form a security interest.11 Only then
does the debtor12 have a specified obligation, as defined by the security
interest, to the secured party.13 If debtor default14 occurs, then the
secured party has certain rights to the collateral,15 which could be in the
debtor’s possession.16 One of the secured party’s rights is self-help
repossession. Section 9-609 of the UCC states that “[a]fter default, a
secured party . . . may take possession of the collateral . . . pursuant to
judicial process; or . . . without judicial process, if it proceeds without
breach of the peace.”17
This Comment focuses on the difficulty courts have in defining the
term “breach of the peace” within the meaning of the UCC. For
example, if a repossession agent asks the police to provide him with
protection as he repossesses a vehicle, is this a breach of the peace that
makes the self-help repossession unlawful? Does a breach of the peace
occur when a homeowner assaults someone trespassing on his property
in an effort to repossess lawn furniture? Imagine that the same
homeowner does not notice his property being repossessed, but the
creditor has to cut a lock and bypass a gate to repossess the property.

8. UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 16, 2 U.L.A. 27 (1922) (creating standardized rules and
regulations for the sale and lease of goods).
9. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
10. Id. The UCC defines a “secured party” as “a person in whose favor a security interest is
created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is
outstanding . . . .” U.C.C. § 9-102(72) (1999).
11. “Security interest” is defined as “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation . . . .” U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1999). A security interest is
created when the following three requirements are met: (1) value has been given; (2) the debtor has
rights in the collateral; and (3) the collateral is either in possession of the third party or the debtor
has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203
(1999).
12. “Debtor” is defined as “[o]ne who owes an obligation to another, esp[ecially] an obligation to
pay money.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 433 (8th ed. 2004).
13. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1999).
14. “Default” is defined as “[t]he omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty;
esp[ecially], the failure to pay a debt when due.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (8th ed. 2004).
15. “Collateral” is defined as “the property subject to a security interest,” including “proceeds to
which a security interest attaches . . . .” U.C.C. § 9-102(12) (2004).
16. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
17. Id.
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Does this breach the peace even if there is no confrontation? What if the
debtor experiences emotional distress or something happens to a neutral
third party? Chapa v. Traciers & Associates18 illustrates the difficulty
courts face in defining and applying the “breach of the peace” concept.
In that case, a repossession agent performed a self-help repossession and
towed the debtor’s vehicle away while—unbeknownst to the agent—the
debtor’s children were still inside.19 The court decided that the agent’s
actions did not constitute a breach of the peace,20 even though the debtor
likely experienced extreme emotional distress from thinking that her
children had been abducted. As Chapa illustrates, the lack of a clear
definition for “breach of the peace” in the self-help repossession context
has left parties without a remedy in the face of significant emotional,
physical, or financial harm caused by a repossessing creditor. It has also
produced harmful uncertainty for creditors, who are unable to determine
the scope of their repossession rights ex ante.
Part I of this Comment traces the history of self-help repossession
from its origins in the Roman Empire through its eventual codification in
the UCC. Part II explains how courts treat breach of the peace claims
inconsistently, demonstrating the need for uniformity across
jurisdictions. It also discusses how the UCC’s ex post enforcement
approach failed to anticipate certain modern day economic conditions
that require a universal approach to breach of the peace review.21 Part III
recommends that all states adopt a two-part test to define “breach of the
peace,” considering the goals of self-help repossession while effectively
balancing the rights of the debtor, the secured party, and the public at
large.
I.

BEFORE CODIFICATION IN THE UCC, SELF-HELP
REPOSSESSION RETAINED ITS ESSENTIAL CHARACTER
AS AN EXTRAJUDICIAL REMEDY AVAILABLE TO
LIMITED GROUPS OF PEOPLE

Self-help repossession has existed in some form since the creation of
the debtor-creditor concept, which prompted an “injured person to take
from the wrongdoer . . . whatever is seizable and transportable.”22 When
18. 267 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
19. Id. at 389.
20. Id. at 395–96.
21. “Ex post” is defined as “[b]ased on knowledge and fact; viewed after the fact, in hindsight;
objective; retrospective.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
22. See STREET, supra note 1, at 279.
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bartering was the sole method of immediate exchange, there was no need
for repossession because payment was made in full upon exchange of
goods. However, as the debtor–creditor relationship developed, self-help
repossession became an efficient remedy for delinquency.23 As
economies developed and technology improved, the concept and
execution of self-help repossession remained relatively unchanged.24
Societies also continued to regulate how and when this extrajudicial
right could be implemented.25 This pattern continues to the present day:
the drafters of the UCC adopted and endorsed self-help repossession as
an efficient extrajudicial tool, but failed to provide a precise definition
that indicates the lawful scope of the remedy.26
A.

Self-Help Repossession Has Existed Since the Roman Empire and
Was Incorporated into English Common Law

The concept of self-help repossession can be traced to the Roman
legal concept of “distress,” which was the practice of “taking [a]
personal chattel without legal process from the possession of a
wrongdoer into the hands of the party aggrieved, as a pledge for the
redress of an injury, the performance of a duty, or the satisfaction of a
demand.”27 Referred to in Roman law as pignoris capio, it differed from
other legal remedies because of its extrajudicial nature.28 This
extrajudicial right could, however, only be exercised in a few specific
situations.29 For example, the remedy was available to enforce payment
for animals or for animal sacrifices when payment was not properly
made.30 The property seized satisfied the claim and provided a complete
remedy.31
The Teutonic people of the Middle Ages32 also utilized self-help

23. See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text.
25. Id.
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. STREET, supra note 1, at 278 (quoting JAMES BRADBY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DISTRESSES 1 (Philadelphia, J.S. Littell, 2d ed. 1833)).
28. Id. at 280
29. Id. at 280–81.
30. Id. at 281.
31. Id.
32. “Teuton” is defined as “a member of an ancient [probably] Germanic or Celtic people . . . a
member of one of the peoples speaking a language of the Germanic branch of the Indo-European
family of languages.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2365 (3d ed. 2002).
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repossession, but only with limited procedures.33 Though a party could
pursue the remedy without recourse to the courts, formal procedural
requirements applied.34 The process required three witnesses to
accompany the creditor to the debtor’s home, at which point the creditor
would make a formal demand for repayment.35 The demand had to
include a description of both the property that was to be repossessed and
the property’s value.36 If the debtor refused to fulfill the demand, then
the creditor was forced to pursue a remedy in the courts.37
Pre-colonial English law had similarly strict rules governing when a
self-help repossession could take place, what items could be
repossessed, and the manner of taking and disposing of these items.38
Early English law opposed self-help remedies altogether, viewing them
as “an enemy of law, a contempt of the king and his court.”39 Even selfdefense was disfavored as a form of self-help remedy.40 As the Middle
Ages progressed, however, English opposition to self-help remedies
relaxed, though such remedies remained subject to restrictive rules and
regulations.41 For example, the distress remedy was only available for
non-payment of rent and destruction of property by someone else’s
animals.42 Additionally, only personal chattels could be recovered as a
distress remedy, and the performance of distress had to take place during
the daytime, with very few exceptions.43 Interestingly, the English
permitted third-party assistance in performing the repossession and also
gave the creditor a right of action for items that had been fraudulently
removed from the debtor’s property in anticipation of the distress
action.44 The cause of action for fraudulent removal applied not only
against the debtor, but also to “all persons privy to, or assisting in, such

33. STREET, supra note 1, at 282–83.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 2 POLLOCK & M AITLAND, supra note 6, at 574–77.
39. Id. at 574.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 576–78.
42. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (Thomas M. Cooley
ed. vol. 2 1871) (“[W]here a man finds beasts of a stranger wandering in his grounds . . . doing him
hurt or damage . . . in which case the owner of the soil may detain them, till satisfaction be made
him for the injury he has thereby sustained.”).
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id.
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fraudulent conveyance, forfeit double the value to the landlord.”45
B.

Self-Help Repossession Was First Recognized by the U.S. Courts in
the Nineteenth Century and Codified in the Early Twentieth
Century

The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed self-help repossession in
1842.46 Prigg v. Pennsylvania47 concerned repossession of a slave who
had escaped from Maryland and crossed into Pennsylvania.48 In deciding
that the slave owner was allowed to pursue and retake his property, the
Court applied English self-help principles, including breach of the
peace.49 Quoting Blackstone, the Court explained that “the owner of the
goods, and the husband, parent or master, may lawfully claim and retake
them, wherever he happens to find them, so it be not in a riotous manner,
or attended with a breach of the peace.”50 Applying this rule to the facts
of Prigg, the Court held, “[T]he owner of a slave is clothed with entire
authority, in every state in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave,
whenever he can do it, without any breach of the peace or any illegal
violence.”51 Prigg appears to be the first time that “breach of the peace”
was used in the United States to describe the lawful bounds of
repossession. Aside from Prigg, most of the early American cases
addressing self-help repossession involved enforcement of contracts,
which expressly provided for the self-help remedy in the event of a
breach.52 Other cases, however, identified a right of repossession within
a sales contract without an express provision.53
The remedy of self-help repossession was codified in the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act of 1918 (UCSA), a predecessor to the UCC.54 The
UCSA incorporated the two central precepts of the common law remedy:
(1) when a buyer is in default of payment, “the seller may retake
possession;” and, (2) “[u]nless the goods can be retaken without breach
45. Id.
46. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 613 (1842).
47. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
48. Id. at 539.
49. Id. at 613.
50. Id. (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 4).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Wilmerding v. Rhodes-Haverty Furniture Co., 50 S.E. 100 (Ga. 1905); Swain v.
Schild, 117 N.E. 933 (Ind. App. 1907); Flaherty v. Ginsburg, 110 N.W. 1050 (Iowa 1907).
53. See, e.g., Blackford v. Neaves, 205 P. 587 (Ariz. 1922); C.I.T. Corp. v. Reeves, 150 So. 638
(Fla. 1933); Westerman v. Or. Auto. Credit Corp., 122 P.2d 435, 439 (Or. 1942).
54. UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 16, 2 U.L.A. 27 (1922).
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of the peace, they shall be retaken by legal process.”55
C.

The Uniform Commercial Code Provides a Self-Help Remedy to
Any Secured Party

The UCC emerged from a joint project of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCC) and the American Law
Institute (ALI).56 Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the UCC in
1954, and Louisiana remains the only state not to adopt the UCC in its
entirety.57 UCC revisions are made periodically, with the most recent
revision occurring in 2003.58 The UCC’s Chief Reporter, Karl
Llewellyn, stated that the drafters of Article 959—which includes the
self-help repossession provision—sought to change the law of personal
property in order to establish greater simplicity, fairness, and
uniformity.60
Section 9-503 was the UCC’s original statutory expression of selfhelp repossession.61 The drafters of the UCC intended to build upon the
prior codification of self-help repossession found in the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act and the UCSA.62 Accordingly, section 9-503 stated:
“Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may
proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of
the peace or may proceed by action.”63 The official comments to this
section do not define “breach of the peace.”64 Nevertheless, the UCC
took the step of allowing self-help repossession of any collateral by any
55. Id.
56. Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-1949, 51
SMU L. REV. 275, 276 (1998).
57. Uniform Commercial Code; UCC, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREDIT,
http://www.encyclopediaofcredit.com/Uniform-Commercial-Code (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
58. Past and Present ALI Projects, AMERICAN
http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALIprojects.pdf.

LAW

INSTITUTE

(Apr.

2010),

59. Article 9 of the UCC deals exclusively with secured transactions. Section 9-109 states that
this Article applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in
personal property or fixtures by contract.” U.C.C. § 9-109 (1999).
60. Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687
(1948).
61. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972).
62. Id. § 9-503 cmt. (“This Article follows the provisions of the earlier uniform legislation in
allowing the secured party in most cases to take possession without the issuance of judicial
process.”).
63. Id. § 9-503.
64. Id. § 9-503 cmt.
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secured creditor.65 This was a monumental break with the long history of
self-help repossession as a limited remedy.66 Having been adopted by
forty-nine states,67 the UCC created a self-help remedy that is currently
available to masses of secured creditors.
Section 9-609 of the UCC is the current expression of self-help
repossession approved by the drafters in 1999. Section 9-609 states that
“[a]fter default, a secured party: (1) may take possession of the
collateral; and (2) without removal, may render equipment
unusable . . . (1) pursuant to judicial process; or (2) without judicial
process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.”68 Although little
changed from the text of former section 9-503, there are some important
differences between the two provisions. First, section 9-609 explicitly
subjects the disabling of equipment69 to the breach of the peace
requirement.70 Former section 9-503 only addressed this scenario in the
commentary and it was unclear whether the breach of the peace
requirement applied.71 Section 9-609 makes clear that this requirement
extends beyond literal repossession to disabling equipment as well.72
The second important change appears in the official commentary.
Comment 3 to section 9-609 addresses the meaning of breach of the
peace and gives some guidance for courts.73 The drafters of the current
UCC avoided creating specific guidelines for what constitutes breach of
the peace, except to say that (1) courts should hold secured parties liable
for breaches created by third parties when done on their behalf, and (2)
65. Id. § 9-503.
66. See supra Part I.A.
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
69. Id. While this addition to the UCC is not relevant to this Comment, it does show that the
drafters took the time to specify what actions were subject to the “breach of the peace” requirement,
while at the same time not defining what constitutes a breach. Disabling of equipment may occur in
the case of collateral such as heavy equipment, when the physical removal from the debtor’s
property and storage pending resale may be very expensive and impracticable. U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt.
(1972).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
73. Id. § 9-609 cmt. 3 (“Subsection (b) permits a secured party to proceed under this section
without judicial process if it does so ‘without breach of the peace’ . . . . Like former Section 9-503,
this section does not define or explain the conduct that will constitute a breach of the peace, leaving
that matter for continuing development by the courts . . . . [C]ourts should hold the secured party
responsible for the actions of others taken on the secured party’s behalf, including independent
contractors engaged by the secured party to take possession of collateral. This section does not
authorize a secured party who repossesses without judicial process to utilize the assistance of a lawenforcement officer.”).

16 -- McRobert FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

6/23/2012 8:18 AM

SELF-HELP REPOSSESSIONS

577

secured parties are not permitted to use the assistance of law
enforcement personnel to accomplish a self-help repossession.74
However, these articulated limits only aid in statutory interpretation and
are not binding.75 By relegating these details to the commentary, the
UCC drafters avoided creating binding statutory guidelines for breach of
the peace issues,76 thereby deferring to the judiciary. Therefore, in order
to determine the current standard for breach of the peace, one must look
to judicial decisions and their respective interpretations of “breach of the
peace.”
D.

In Breaking with the Common Law and Making Self-Help
Repossession Available to the Masses, the Drafters of the UCC
Failed to Anticipate the Future of Commercial Transactions,
Leading to an Ex Post Approach for Enforcement

Historically, self-help repossession was limited to certain classes of
people77 or very specific situations.78 The UCC broke from this common
law tradition by abandoning the historical limits on the availability of
self-help repossession and making the remedy available to any creditor
upon default.79
As they expanded the availability of the self-help repossession
remedy, the UCC drafters failed to articulate the lawful scope of the
remedy by defining “breach of the peace.”80 This omission has become
increasingly problematic as consumer debt81 and the number of
repossessions has increased dramatically, showcased by the number of
repossessed vehicles alone approaching nearly two million annually.82 In

74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Pride Hyundai, Inc. v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 369 F.3d 603, 613 (1st Cir. 2004); Smith v.
First Union Nat’l Bank of Tenn., 958 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
76. U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3.
77. See supra Part I.A.
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. U.C.C. § 9-609.
80. Id.
81. Consumer
Credit
–
G.19,
BD.
GOVERNORS
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_sa.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (Total
outstanding consumer credit in January 1950 was $19,050,870,000. Total outstanding consumer
credit in December 2010 was $2,408,335,190,000.).
82. See JOHN W. VAN ALST & RICK JURGENS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., REPO MADNESS –
HOW AUTOMOBILE REPOSSESSIONS ENDANGER OWNERS, AGENTS AND THE PUBLIC 1 (2010),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/special_projects/auto/report-repo-madness.pdf; see
also Table 1-11: Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, RES. &
INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN. BUREAU TRANSP. STAT.,
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choosing not to define “breach of the peace,” the drafters failed to
provide guidance for debtors, creditors, and the courts, instead leaving
the judiciary to fill in the meaning of the term.83
This has created an ex post approach under which courts must define
“breach of the peace” on a case-by-case basis. A limited ex post
approach to breach of the peace made sense at the time of the UCC’s
drafting. Even though the remedy was made available to the general
public, consumer debt was only a small fraction of what it is today.84
Much less consumer debt translated to fewer security interests and
potential repossessions. It was logical to think that courts would rarely
see these cases and would have the time to slowly flesh out consistent
case law that could be universally applied. In the contemporary
economy, however, the number of self-help repossession cases has
exploded,85 leading to uncertainty in business and inconsistency in the
courts.
II.

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY
HAVE ADOPTED DISTINCT INTERPRETATIONS OF
“BREACH OF THE PEACE”

Due to the UCC drafters’ failure to define “breach of the peace,”86
state courts across the country have created varying rules for self-help
enforcement and federal courts have inconsistently interpreted state
laws.87 A few jurisdictions adopted a balancing test applicable to all
“breach of the peace” cases.88 The majority of jurisdictions, however,
use a case-by-case approach to determine whether a breach has occurred
based on the specific factual circumstances.89

http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_11.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2012) (As a point of comparison showing that in 1960 there were 74.4 million
registered vehicles in the United States and in 2009 there were 254.2 million registered vehicles in
the United States.).
83. 1 BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 4–82 (1993).
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. U.C.C. § 9-609 (1999).
87. See infra Part II.A–B.
88. See infra Part II.A.
89. See infra Part II.B.
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Several Jurisdictions Have Adopted a Five-Factor Balancing Test
in an Effort to Promote Consistent Interpretation of “Breach of the
Peace”

Some jurisdictions have adopted a balancing test for determining
whether a “breach of the peace” occurred in the course of self-help
repossession.90 The balancing test generally considers five factors: 1)
where the repossession took place; 2) the debtor’s express or
constructive consent; 3) the reactions of third parties; 4) the type of
premises entered; and 5) the creditors’ use of deception.91 North
Carolina and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appear to
weigh the factors equally, but do not specify how many factors must be
satisfied to constitute a breach of the peace.92 Tennessee, on the other
hand, appeared to adopt the test in Davenport v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,93
but did not balance the factors in its decision, focusing solely on the type
of premises entered.94 Some commentators suggest that the balancing
approach gives a court (and jury) the ability to analyze a case’s
particular facts under a consistent, objective framework, rather than an
inconsistent, subjective perspective.95 Nevertheless, the few jurisdictions
that have adopted this approach have applied it in a somewhat varying
manner.
B.

The Majority of Jurisdictions Use a Fact-Specific Inquiry to
Identify a Breach of the Peace
The large majority of jurisdictions do not employ a formal balancing

90. See, e.g., Clarin v. Minn. Repossessors, 198 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1999); Giles v. First Va.
Credit Serv., 560 S.E.2d 557, 565 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Davenport v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 818
S.W.2d 23, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
91. This balancing test first appeared in a secondary source, to be used for guidance. See 2 JAMES
J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 575–82 (3d ed. 1988) (not listing
the factors specifically, but discussing each of them). It has since been adopted by North Carolina,
Tennessee, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. See Giles, 560 S.E.2d at 565–66 (weighing all five factors and finding that all of them favor
the repossessing party); see also Clarin, 198 F.3d at 664 (same).
93. 818 S.W.2d 23, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
94. Davenport, 818 S.W.2d at 29–30 (the court introduces the factors, but does not perform the
balancing test, finding that a breach occurred because the repossessing party broke a lock to enter
the premises).
95. See, e.g., Giles, 560 S.E.2d at 565–66 (“[W]e do not agree with the plaintiffs that every
repossession should be analyzed subjectively . . . . We therefore adopt a balancing test using the five
factors discussed above to determine whether a breach of the peace occurs when there is no
confrontation.”).
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test for breach of the peace.96 Instead, they engage in fact-specific
inquiries for each case.97 Courts adopting a balancing test explicitly state
factors as exclusive for determining whether a breach has occurred in
future cases.98 By contrast, as will be shown throughout this Part, courts
using a fact-based model analyze each case individually, creating new
factors and rules based on facts specific to each case, which fails to give
adequate guidance for future determination of breach of the peace.
While court decisions vary, many courts consistently consider the
following factors for breach of the peace determination: the use of law
enforcement, violence or threats of violence, trespass, verbal
confrontation, and disturbance to third parties.99
i.

Courts Are Divided as to Whether Using Law Enforcement in SelfHelp Repossession Automatically Constitutes a Breach of the
Peace

Comment 3 to UCC section 9-609 indicates that the use of law
enforcement to effect a self-help repossession constitutes a breach of the
peace.100 However, the UCC comments are not binding, but are used as
an aid in statutory interpretation.101 In their interpretation and application
of section 9-609, courts vary as to the weight they give to Comment 3’s
prohibition against using law enforcement in self-help repossession.102
There are two ways in which creditors rely on law enforcement to
effect a self-help repossession, which courts treat differently with regard
to the “breach of the peace” analysis: the officer may help with the
repossession itself,103 or the officer’s mere presence may provide passive
protection for the creditor and deter potential violence.104 Courts
consistently hold that officer assistance with the repossession constitutes
a breach of the peace.105 In Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler,106 the
96. See infra Part II.B.i–v.
97. Id.
98. See supra Part II.A.
99. See infra Part II.B.i–v.
100. See U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3 (1999).
101. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 101–12 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that
the officer came between the parties and told the debtor that if he “interfered any further or in any
way” that he “was going straight to jail”).
104. See, e.g., Walker v. Walthall, 588 P.2d 863, 865 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
105. See, e.g., Harris, 664 F.2d at 1127; Jackson v. Richards, 433 A.2d 888, 895–96, n.11 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981); Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 757, 463 P.2d 651, 655 (1970).
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Washington State Court of Appeals held that even an officer’s verbal
assistance “amounted to constructive force, intimidation and oppression
constituting breach of the peace.”107 In that case, the court held that even
though the officer only participated in the repossession in a verbal
manner, telling the debtor, “We come over to pick up this tractor,”108 the
officer became a participant in the repossession.109 The fact that the
officer did not physically participate in the repossession was
irrelevant.110
In contrast to the bright-line rule regarding officer participation,
courts vary regarding whether the mere presence of law enforcement
personnel constitutes a breach of the peace. The Arizona Court of
Appeals held in Walker v. Walthall111 that the mere presence of a
uniformed deputy sheriff at the site of repossession constituted a breach
of the peace.112 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
applying Michigan law, adopted a similar standard in United States v.
Coleman,113 but declined to extend it to mere officer surveillance.114 In
Coleman, the police officer remained around the corner from the
location of the repossession and out of sight.115 The Sixth Circuit agreed
with the logic and ruling of the Walker court, but found that the police
officer’s role was one of passive surveillance instead of presence or
participation.116 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Walker
court, finding that “mere acquiescence by the police to ‘stand by in case
of trouble’” was permitted during repossession.117
ii.

Courts Consistently View Violence or Threats of Violence as a
Breach of the Peace

No reported case has held that an act of violence was not a breach of
the peace in the context of self-help repossession. Although all courts

106. 1 Wash. App. 750, 757, 463 P.2d 651, 655 (1970).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 588 P.2d 863 (Ariz. 1978).
112. Id. at 865.
113. 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 964.
115. Id. at 963.
116. Id. at 964 n.1.
117. Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981).
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recognize actual violence as an automatic breach of the peace, courts
disagree on their analysis when there is only a threat of violence. The
Arkansas Supreme Court held that a breach occurs when “force, or
threats of force, or risk of invoking violence, accompanie[s] the
repossession.”118 Additionally, Tennessee has stated that a breach of the
peace “must involve some violence or threat of violence.”119 Not all
threats are sufficient, however; Wyoming requires that violence must be
reasonably likely and not a remote possibility for a threat to constitute a
breach of the peace.120 As shown below, many courts have a lower
threshold, finding a breach of peace even without actual violence or a
threat of violence.
iii.

Courts Are Inconsistent in Their Treatment of Trespass as a
Breach of the Peace

Trespass cases are widely litigated, covering a large spectrum of
unique fact patterns. This has led to divergent holdings. Courts assessing
whether a creditor’s trespass during self-help repossession constituted a
breach of the peace consider many factors, including: (1) proximity to
the debtor’s household (e.g., whether the creditor trespassed inside or
outside the home, in the yard, or driveway),121 and (2) efforts by the
debtor to protect the repossessed property (e.g., closed doors, locks, and
signs).122
Generally, the creditor may not enter the debtor’s home without
permission.123 In jurisdictions that have addressed this issue directly,
courts agree that the home is sacred and a breach of the peace occurs
anytime someone enters without permission.124 This is consistent with
the general stance in American law that the home is a protected space,
from which the homeowner is generally entitled to exclude third

118. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Herring, 589 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Ark. 1979).
119. McCall v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
120. Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colo. Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 474 n.3 (1990). The
court does not go any further in defining “reasonably likely” other than to contrast it with a “remote
possibility.”
121. See infra notes 120–27 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 187 So. 491, 493 (Ala. 1939); Girard v.
Anderson, 257 N.W. 400, 402–03 (Iowa 1934) (finding that repossession of a piano through forcible
entry of a debtor’s residence constitutes a breach of the peace even though the repossessing party
claimed that the door was unlocked); Hileman v. Harter Bank & Trust Co., 186 N.E.2d 853, 855
(Ohio 1962).
124. See Hartzog, 187 So. at 493; Girard, 257 N.W. at 402–03; Hileman, 186 N.E. 2d at 855.
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parties.125 This tradition, coupled with the desire that self-help
repossession occur without violence,126 has led courts to conclude that
trespass inside the debtor’s home automatically constitutes a breach of
the peace.
As the creditor retreats from the residence of the debtor and into the
driveway, yard, or street, the debtor’s ability to claim an automatic
breach of the peace becomes more difficult.127 No reported decision has
held that mere trespass onto the debtor’s property without entering the
home constitutes a breach of the peace.128 Instead, courts have held that
such trespasses are a necessary part of lawful repossessions.129
However, the cases are inconsistent when the creditor does not
trespass into the debtor’s home but does disregard express measures
taken by the debtor to protect his property. Courts generally hold that a
creditor who breaks a lock or chain to enter the property of a debtor is
guilty of breaching the peace.130 However, a line of cases from New
York hold that a breach of the peace does not occur when a creditor
enters through a locked door by using a key obtained without
authorization or by cutting locks.131 Though there is little case law
considering a creditor’s disregard of a debtor’s “No Trespassing” sign,
one reported case on point held that such action does not itself constitute
a breach of the peace.132

125. See generally, Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat Where Assailant Is Social Guest on
Premises, 100 A.L.R.3D 532 (1980).
126. See supra Part II.B.ii.
127. See WHITE, supra note 91, at 577.
128. See, e.g., Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1987) (secured
creditor making unauthorized entry onto driveway of debtor’s residence to remove vehicle is not
breach of the peace); Hester v. Bandy, 627 So.2d 833, 840 (Miss. 1993) (“[S]imply going upon the
private driveway of the debtor and taking possession of secured collateral, without more, does not
constitute a breach of the peace.”); Ragde v. Peoples Bank, 53 Wash. App. 173, 176–77, 767 P.2d
949, 951 (1989) (repossession of car from driveway at 5:00 a.m. was not breach of the peace).
129. See Butler, 829 F.2d at 570; Hester, 627 So.2d at 840; Ragde, 53 Wash. App. at 176–77, 767
P.2d at 951.
130. See, e.g., Martin v. Dorn Equip. Co. 821 P.2d 1025, 1026–28 (Mont. 1991) (cutting chains
connected to a lock is a breach of the peace); Williamson v. Fowler Toyota, Inc., 956 P.2d 858, 859,
862 (Okla. 1998) (cutting gate’s chain without permission is a breach of the peace); Davenport v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 818 S.W.2d 23, 26, 29–30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (entering garage and
cutting chains that attached car to post in garage to repossess the car is a breach of the peace).
131. See, e.g., Global Casting Indus., Inc. v. Daley-Hodkin Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1980); Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff’d, 288
N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
132. See Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Flynn, 88 S.W.3d 142, 147–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
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Courts Are Inconsistent in Their Treatment of Verbal
Confrontations During Self-Help Repossession

Courts are divided regarding the legal effect of a debtor’s verbal
objections to self-help repossession. Some courts have held that a
debtor’s verbal objection, however minor, makes any seizure a breach of
the peace.133 Other courts require a somewhat higher level of protest,
requiring an “unequivocal oral protest”134 or “repossession in the face of
the debtor’s objection.”135
Courts that allow repossession to occur after a verbal objection do so
only if the nature of the objection suggests that it is not likely to lead to a
physical confrontation. The Fifth District Appellate Court of Illinois
found that no breach of the peace occurred when the debtor yelled,
“Don’t take it,” to a secured creditor attempting to repossess his car.136
Defining “breach of the peace” as “conduct which incites or is likely to
incite immediate public turbulence,”137 the court found no violation of
the self-help repossession doctrine because the repossessor made no
physical or verbal response to the debtor’s request and the debtor elected
not to act in a violent manner.138 Using similar reasoning, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found no breach of the peace when a
creditor completed the repossession after the debtor interrupted but
allowed the debtor to recover his personal items before seizing the
vehicle.139 The court supported the district judge’s reasoning that the
repossession was accomplished without the risk of violence because
“[t]he evidence does not reveal that [the repossessing creditors]
performed any act which was oppressive, threatening or tended to cause
physical violence.”140 Finally, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ignored a
potential verbal objection by holding that there was no breach of the
peace when a secured creditor continued repossession of a vehicle after
the debtor told him, “Well, I wish you wouldn’t but I’m not going to do
133. See, e.g., Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 820 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Oklahoma
law, the court determined that any debtor’s request for secured creditor to stop constitutes breach of
the peace); Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 508 N.W.2d 449, 451–53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding creditor repossessing debtor’s automobile constituted a breach of the peace where debtor
protested to repossessing agent, “You are not going to take the Bronco”).
134. See Dixon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 391 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979).
135. See First & Farmers Bank, Inc. v. Henderson, 763 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
136. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1173–74 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996).
137. Id. at 1173.
138. Id. at 1174.
139. Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1982).
140. Id. at 719.
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anything to stop you.”141 According to these courts, if the debtor objects
to the repossession, a breach of the peace will occur if the creditor
continues the repossession despite a likelihood of violence. If the
creditor does not continue the repossession where there is a likelihood of
violence, there is no breach of the peace regardless of whether there has
been a verbal objection by the debtor.
v.

Courts Have Not Recognized Disturbances to Third Parties as
Breaches of the Peace

Some courts believe that disturbances to third parties do not constitute
a breach of the peace. The 2008 case of Chapa v. Tracier & Associates
provides one of the most outlandish examples of a court’s refusal to
recognize harm to third parties as a breach of the peace.142 A
repossession agent, hired by the secured creditor and acting as an agent
of the creditor,143 repossessed a vehicle from a public street when the
driver was absent.144 The repossession agent was unaware that in the
backseat of the car were the debtor’s two young children.145 Within a
very short period of time, the agent realized the children were in the
vehicle, turned around, and returned the children and the vehicle to the
mother (Maria).146 The court held that there was no breach of the peace
because there was no objection “at, near, or incident to the seizure of
property.”147 Any harm done after the repossession had taken place was
not considered, as the court only focused on the nature of conduct of the
repossessor’s conduct.148 The court reached this decision despite the
harm done to the children, Maria, and Maria’s brother, who was not the
debtor but was present and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder as a result of the incident.149
A South Carolina court used similar reasoning regarding the safety of
third parties in Jordan v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of South
Carolina.150 After the debtor’s truck had been repossessed, the debtor

141. Teeter Motor Co., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Hot Springs, 543 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Ark. 1976).
142. See Chapa v. Traciers & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
143. Id. at 389.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 395.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 389–90.
150. 298 S.E.2d 213, 214 (S.C. 1982).
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pursued the creditor in another vehicle for up to thirty minutes.151 During
the pursuit, the creditor “exceeded the speed limit, failed to observe
traffic signals and drove recklessly.”152 Even though the safety of the
public was presumably endangered by a tow truck driving recklessly, the
court did not find a breach of the peace.153 In fact, the court stated that
even if the reckless driving constituted a general breach of the peace, it
was irrelevant because it was not incident to the repossession of the
vehicle.154
These courts seem to adhere to the principle that a breach of the peace
can arise solely from interactions between the debtor and creditor at the
time of the repossession, such as violence, verbal confrontation, or
trespass. Harm or threatened harm to third parties immediately following
the repossession does not give rise to a breach of the peace.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, courts applying a fact-specific
inquiry to identify a breach of the peace vary considerably in their
selection and treatment of the relevant factors. This variation has led to
confusion, uncertainty, and potentially dangerous situations as parties
must guess at the scope of their rights in the context of self-help
repossession.
C.

Inconsistent Decisions of Courts Nationwide Reflect the
Unpredictability Caused by the UCC, Displaying a Need for
Reform

Ex post, case-by-case analysis of what constitutes a breach of the
peace has produced inconsistent standards for lawful self-help
repossession across jurisdictions.155 This variation undermines
predictability for debtors, creditors, and the public, and promotes
needless litigation. While the five-factor approach provides greater
predictability than the free-form, fact-specific approach, it is still
inadequate in providing guidance for affected parties in advance of
litigation.

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part II.B.
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Courts Should Adopt a Uniform Definition of “Breach of the
Peace” in Order to Provide Clarity for Debtors, Creditors, and the
Public

To dispense with the current inconsistency in the case law, courts
should adopt a uniform analysis for identifying a breach of the peace in
order to promote fairness, consistency, and predictability. The purpose
of self-help repossession is:
(1) to benefit creditors in permitting them to realize collateral
without having to resort to judicial process; (2) to benefit
debtors in general by making credit available at lower costs . . .
and (3) to support a public policy discouraging extrajudicial acts
by citizens when those acts are fraught with the likelihood of
resulting violence.156
Keeping this purpose in mind, the test must emphasize all potentially
violent confrontations and consider equally the rights and needs of the
creditor, the debtor, and the public.
The courts should have a legal framework that allows them to
consistently apply the law. Debtors and creditors should be able to
understand the law surrounding breach of the peace so they are able to
properly repossess property and correctly ascertain when a breach of the
peace has occurred. Moreover, companies or individuals who engage in
repossessions in multiple jurisdictions should not have to perform
extensive legal research in order to understand the relevant standards
governing their right to self-help repossession. This is completely
unnecessary and contrary to the purpose of the Uniform Commercial
Code.157 Finally, courts across the country should not be obligated to
create potentially inconsistent decisions every time a new breach of the
peace issue arises. They should have a framework to use and a
functional test to implement.
III. THE UCC SHOULD INCORPORATE A TWO-PART TEST
INCORPORATING PER SE RULES OF EXCLUSION AND
FACTORS OF CONSIDERATION TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A BREACH OF THE PEACE OCCURS DURING
SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION
As a remedy to the current inconsistency surrounding breach of the
peace, the UCC should be amended to incorporate the following two156. Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d 717, 719 n.4 (8th Cir. 1982).
157. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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part test for determining whether a breach of the peace occurs during
self-help repossession. The first part identifies circumstances that
constitute a per se breach of the peace. If the repossession at issue did
not involve a per se breach, then a court should consider the factors
enumerated in the second part of the test to determine whether or not a
breach of the peace occurred.
A.

Under Step One, a Court Should Determine Whether the Case
Involves a Per Se Breach of the Peace

The first part of the breach test identifies three categories of conduct
that constitute a per se breach: involvement of law enforcement, use of
violence, and verbal altercations. If any of these categories of conduct
occur during the course of self-help repossession, then there has been a
breach of the peace. Adopting limited categories of conduct constituting
a per se breach will provide clear guidance to parties and allow courts to
determine whether a breach of the peace occurred during the preliminary
phases of litigation.
i.

Use of Law Enforcement During Any Stage of the Repossession
Constitutes a Per Se Breach of the Peace

Use of law enforcement should not be permitted before, during, or
after the self-help repossession under any circumstances. Under the
proposed test, any use of law enforcement personnel is immediately
deemed to be a breach of the peace and the repossession must end. This
could be as simple as a creditor using an officer to restrain the debtor
during repossession. It can also apply to the debtor or creditor calling the
police for assistance during the repossession because they feel
threatened. This applies to both uniformed and plain-clothes officers as
well as any situation where law enforcement personnel are not used to
physically repossess the collateral, but are merely present at or near the
scene.
The entire purpose of self-help repossession is to allow individuals to
act without first resorting to the judicial system.158 Involving law
enforcement personnel in any capacity is inconsistent with the concept
of an extrajudicial remedy.159 Moreover, prohibiting police involvement

158. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
159. Even though law enforcement personnel technically are part of the executive branch and not
the judicial branch, they still provide legal enforcement to what is supposed to be an extrajudicial
remedy.
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is consistent with UCC commentary160 and case law recognizing that the
use of law enforcement prevents the debtor from “exercising his right to
resist by all lawful and reasonable means a non-judicial take-over.”161
This rule would also remedy the current inconsistency in court decisions
regarding whether or not the mere presence of law enforcement
personnel breaches the peace.162
ii.

No Violence or Threats of Violence Are Permitted During SelfHelp Repossession

Any violence or threats of violence by either the debtor or the creditor
should constitute a per se breach of the peace. Courts across the country
have repeatedly held that violence is a breach of the peace163 and that
one of the objectives of self-help repossession is to discourage
extrajudicial acts that are likely to result in violence.164 The courts are
very clear and consistent on this point,165 which is also supported by
common sense. The drafters of the UCC likely would not have wanted to
create a self-help remedy that would encourage violent or dangerous
behavior.166
For the purpose of the breach test, physical violence encompasses any
physical contact between parties or between the debtor and any
instrument used by the creditor during the repossession of collateral. The
obvious example involves a physical altercation between two parties or a
threat by one party to physically harm the other. However, physical
violence may also occur by using or threatening to use an object such as
a vehicle in a physical manner.167 Additionally, courts should presume
violence when one individual uses his body in a physical or physically
threatening manner against the property of the other party.168 This
160. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
161. Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 757, 463 P.2d 651, 655 (1970).
162. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d 717,720 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
there was no breach of the peace because the repossession was done “without any incident which
might tend to provoke violence”).
165. See supra Part II.B.ii.
166. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2009). The drafters’ express inclusion of the requirement that lawful selfhelp cannot cause a “breach of the peace” evidences this intent.
167. See, e.g., Big Three Motors, Inc. v. Rutherford, 432 So.2d 483, 484–86 (Ala. 1983) (holding
a breach of the peace occurred when the secured party’s agent blocked the debtor’s wife with his
vehicle, while she was driving the secured vehicle, and then persuaded her to drive the vehicle to the
dealership where it was placed “in storage” because of delinquent payments).
168. See, e.g., State v. Trackwell, 458 N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1990). Trackwell held that a breach of
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category of conduct does not encompass verbal confrontations that are
unlikely to incite violence, which are addressed in the following section.
iii.

Verbal Confrontations, as Well as a Creditor’s Failure to Heed a
Verbal Request to Cease Repossession, Constitute a Per Se Breach
of the Peace

A creditor or repossessing agent’s failure to heed the debtor’s verbal
request to terminate the repossession should constitute an immediate
breach of the peace. Currently, courts are divided as to whether a verbal
request or confrontation constitutes a breach of the peace. Some courts
attempt to define the lawful limits of self-help repossession based on the
intensity of the verbal request.169 Other courts focus on the probability of
a violent escalation following the specific verbal confrontation.170
Court decisions attempting to determine the intensity of a verbal
request or the likelihood of violence in a verbal confrontation cause
inconsistencies, unpredictability, and confusion.171 Individual decisions
provide little precedential value because they are limited to a specific set
of facts. Meanwhile, confrontations during attempted repossessions have
resulted in injuries and deaths.172 While we may think that only
confrontations resulting in violence should be avoided, the reality is that
when confronted, debtors, creditors, and/or repossessing agents will not
always act rationally and may display rage without provocation or
warning.173 There is always a possibility that violence will result from a

the peace occurred when a collection agency owner and an employee went to the debtor’s farm at
11:00 p.m., took the secured pickup truck that was loaded with the debtor’s personal property, and
started to pull out despite the protests of the debtor. Id. at 182. The protest consisted of the debtor
pounding on the driver’s side of the pickup and attaching herself to the side of the truck, although
she dropped off near the end of the driveway. Id.
169. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. Some courts have held that a debtor’s
verbal objection, however minor, makes any seizure a breach of the peace. Other courts require a
somewhat higher level of protest, necessitating an “unequivocal oral protest” or a debtor’s “clearly
expressed objection.”
170. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
172. Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Repo Madness Threatens Consumers (Mar. 11,
2010), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/repo-madness-threatens-consumers87338337.html (“Pistols, rifles, shotguns, knives, fists and automobiles are frequently wielded as
weapons in confrontations arising out of self-help repossessions. Since Jan. 1, 2007, those
confrontations have resulted in at least six deaths, dozens of injuries and arrests and uncounted
traumas.”).
173. See, e.g., Kouba v. E. Joliet Bank, 481 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985). A verbal
confrontation occurred during a repossession, after which the unprovoked agent grabbed one of the
debtors, threw her to the ground by her neck, and took the vehicle by force. Id.
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confrontation, especially when a stranger is in the debtor’s driveway
repossessing his or her car. There must be a bright-line rule to promote
consistency and avoid violence. Therefore, under the proposed test, any
verbal request or confrontation by the debtor intended to terminate the
repossession is a breach of the peace and the repossession must
immediately stop. This applies to a hypothetical situation where the
debtor says, “Hey, that’s my car!” or “Stop!” This rule may seem harsh
in its restriction on the lawful scope of self-help repossession, but it is
necessary to create clarity and reduce the risk of unnecessary violence.
Consent to repossession should also be revocable by the debtor at any
time as another measure to avoid a potentially violent confrontation.
After consent is revoked, any physical attempt to repossess property
should automatically constitute a breach of the peace. Revocation of
consent itself is not a breach of the peace because the debtor should also
have the ability to re-invoke his consent if he wishes. If the debtors
initially choose to consent to the repossession of their property and then
for any reason decide that they no longer want to allow the repossession
to take place, they should have the right to do so.
B.

If the Case Does Not Involve a Per Se Breach of the Peace, Then
Courts Should Consider Two Additional Factors to Determine
Whether a Breach Occurred

The second part of the breach test requires equal consideration of two
factors: (1) the degree of trespass and (2) the disturbance to third parties.
If none of the per se exclusionary rules apply, and neither of these two
factors under the second part of the test leads to the conclusion that a
breach occurred, then the court should find that the creditor properly
performed the self-help repossession.
i.

The Degree of Trespass Necessary for Repossession Is Important
in Determining Breach of the Peace

Courts currently struggle in their treatment of trespass as a factor in
determining whether a breach of the peace occurred.174 In order to
properly weigh the rights of the debtor and creditor, the courts should
not treat all trespass as an automatic breach of the peace. The fact that
trespass arises in many repossessions—because people often keep their
property on the premises of their home or business—further complicates

174. See supra Part II.B.iii.
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the issue.175 Nevertheless, courts should focus on the probability of
confrontation, discouraging repossessions that have a greater likelihood
of violence. To that end, courts should analyze: (1) the distance between
the site of the repossession and the debtor’s household, and (2) the
extent to which the debtor has affirmatively protected the property.
The first aspect of the trespass analysis is the distance from the
debtor’s household or business. The general rule should be that a
repossession occurring farther from the debtor’s household or business is
less likely to constitute a breach of the peace.176 Entering a debtor’s
home to repossess collateral is contrary to the sacredness of the home,
potentially very dangerous, and should almost always constitute a breach
of the peace.177 On the other end of the spectrum, repossessing collateral
from the debtor’s driveway involves little trespass to private property
and should not by itself constitute a breach.178 Given the diversity of
potential locations for repossession, courts must consider this on a caseby-case basis, with the guiding principle that greater distance from the
debtor’s residence or business makes it less likely that there was a
breach of the peace.
The second aspect of the trespass analysis is the extent to which the
debtor has affirmatively protected the property the creditor seeks to
repossess. The general rule should be that the greater the protections of
the property used by the debtor, the more likely that a breach of the
peace has occurred. For example, courts should discourage anyone from
breaking locks or cutting chains to reach collateral, making those actions
a breach of the peace.179 However, courts should not consider it a breach

175. See supra Part II.B.iii.
176. See WHITE, supra note 91, at 577.
177. See, e.g., Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 187 So. 491, 493 (Ala. 1939) (“The law
guards with jealous care the sacredness of every man’s dwelling . . . .”); Girard v. Anderson, 257
N.W. 400, 402–03 (Iowa 1934) (Repossession of a piano through an unlocked door of a debtor’s
residence was found to be a breach of the peace even though the door was supposedly unlocked).
178. See, e.g., Butler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 568 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
secured creditor making unauthorized entry onto driveway of debtor’s residence to remove vehicle
is not breach of the peace); Hester v. Bandy, 627 So.2d 833, 840 (Miss. 1993) (“[S]imply going
upon the private driveway of the debtor and taking possession of secured collateral, without more,
does not constitute a breach of the peace.”); Ragde v. Peoples Bank, 53 Wash. App. 173, 176–77,
767 P.2d 949, 951 (1989) (holding that repossession of car from driveway at 5:00 a.m. was not
breach of the peace).
179. See, e.g., Martin v. Dorn Equip., 821 P.2d 1025, 1026–28 (Mont. 1991) (cutting chains
connected to a lock is breach of the peace); Williamson v. Fowler Toyota, Inc., 956 P.2d 858, 859,
862 (Okla. 1998) (cutting gate’s chain without permission is a breach of the peace); Davenport v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 818 S.W.2d 23, 26, 29–30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (entering garage and
cutting chains that attached car to post in garage to repossess the car is a breach of the peace).
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of the peace to disregard a “No Trespassing” sign, because the sign does
not provide any protection beyond letting the world know of the debtor’s
desire to keep unwelcome visitors off of their property.180 Regardless of
the specific facts, courts should use the guiding principle that bypassing
greater levels of protection increases the likelihood that a breach of the
peace occurred.
ii.

Harm to Third Parties Can Cause a Breach of the Peace and
Should be Considered Accordingly

Even though courts consistently hold that a disturbance to third
parties is irrelevant to determining a breach,181 this is a factor that should
be taken into consideration. The UCC drafters’ concern with avoiding
violence is disserved by a standard that wholly omits an entire category
of confrontations from “breach of the peace” analysis. A court should
first consider whether there was a confrontation with a third party that
had the potential to incite violence. For example, if the debtor’s friend or
relative threatens violence or performs a violent act when the creditor is
attempting to repossess property, a court should find a breach of the
peace. Courts should take this seriously and discourage repossessions
when there is the possibility of inciting violent actions from another
party. Preventing violent encounters is the goal in so many breach of the
peace cases182 and there is no reason this should not extend to third
parties, as well as the debtor and creditor.
Next, courts should consider whether the repossession caused an
adverse impact to the person or property of third parties. The Chapa case
exemplifies the irrationality of omitting harm to third parties from
breach of the peace analysis.183 In that case, the court determined that
there was not a breach of the peace even though the repossession agent
unknowingly towed the debtor’s vehicle with her two children still in the
back seat.184 This case creates a dangerous precedent and potential for
detrimental harm to innocent parties. It also shows that courts should
consider the harm done to third parties in a manner similar to the harm
done to debtors and creditors. By treating third parties differently, courts

180. See, e.g., In re Gerber, 51 B.R. 526, 528 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985); Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Flynn,
88 S.W.3d 142, 147–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
181. See, e.g., Chapa v. Traciers & Assocs., 267 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
182. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Herring, 589 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Ark. 1979); McCall v.
Owens, 820 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
183. See Chapa, 267 S.W.3d at 388–90.
184. Id. at 389.
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provide no relief to a mother who realized that her car was gone with her
children still inside and the uncle who is now suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder as a result.185 Therefore, courts should hold that
any conduct by the creditor that would constitute a breach of the peace if
perpetrated against the debtor, should likewise constitute a breach of the
peace if perpetrated against a third party during or immediately after the
repossession.
CONCLUSION
The UCC’s failure to define “breach of the peace” has produced
considerable uncertainty and inconsistency in the scope of lawful selfhelp repossession. In order to remedy this situation, the UCC should
incorporate the proposed two-part test that coherently defines “breach of
the peace” in a manner that balances the interests of the debtor, creditor,
and public at large. This two-part test first identifies three categories of
conduct that constitute a per se breach of the peace. A breach of the
peace necessarily occurs if: (1) there is any use of law enforcement
during the repossession; (2) there is any violence or threat of violence; or
(3) there is any unheeded verbal request to cease the repossession. If
none of the per se rules have been violated, then courts should proceed
to the second part of the test, which requires consideration of the degree
of trespass involved and any impact on third parties. This test will create
greater consistency and predictability for debtors and creditors, and
ensure a safer environment for the public.

185. Id.

